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THE APOCALYPSE OF PRIVILEGE: 
POPE’S MISREPRESENTATION OF
RICHARD BENTLEY IN 
THE DUNCIAD
Fred Hoerner
University of Texas at Austin
Tradition has it that Pope’s animosity towards Richard Bentley was 
bom over dinner one evening at Dr. Mead’s, soon after the publication 
of Pope’s edition of Homer. As the story goes,
Pope, desirous of [Bentley’s] opinion of the 
translation, addressed him thus: ‘Dr. Bentley, I ordered 
my bookseller to send you your books; I hope you 
received them.’ Bentley, who had purposely avoided 
saying any thing about Homer, pretended not to 
understand him, and asked, ‘Books! books! what books?’ 
‘My Homer,’ replied Pope, ‘which you did me the honour 
to subscribe for.’—‘Oh,’said Bentley, ‘ay, now I 
recollect—your translation—it is a pretty poem, Mr. 
Pope; but you must not call it Homer.1
In effect, by pointing out the gap between Pope’s poem and the 
classical presence it was to represent, Bentley accused Pope of the crime 
with which Pope, in The Dunciad IV, would later charge Bentley: the 
creation of an arbitrary, self-serving verbal order fobbed off as learning. 
The mirroring here suggests that each writer’s contempt for the arbitrary 
sway of language compelled him to construct verbal systems built of 
precisely what each writer loathed.
A close look at what Bentley wrote and did reveals that his critical 
eye saw things quite the inverse of the fragmented “microscopic wit” he 
is accused of in The Dunciad. Far from useless pedantry, Bentley’s 
notion of the critic placed him as no less than the arbitrer of scriptural 
legitimacy and interpretation, thereby making verbal criticism the 
methodic guide not just to school work but to revelation, and would so 
in a way that aimed to avoid what he deemed the twin evils of the time: 
slavish popery and unguided enthusiasm. Though Bentley sought to 
link this critical method to disinterested “sincerity,” his practice of it 
sought highly interested ends, such as Anglican and Whig hegemony at 
the national level—and naked self-interest at the personal.2 Surely the 
insidious injection of ideology into scriptural interpretation smacks of 
just the abuses that fueled Bentley’s contempt for papists. On its own,
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there is a self-transgression worthy of pursuit, but in this essay I will 
ponder why Pope insists on representing Bentley as the inverse of the 
energetic, politically scheming character he was. Why does Pope insist 
on making Bentley sleepy and irrelevant when he was open to harsher 
charges?
Much of my interest focuses on these writers’ constructions of 
hierarchies out of the very chaos they perceive threatens their sense of 
true Order. As Peter Stallybrass and Alon White point out, such 
hierarchies are necessarily conflictual because their terms rest upon that 
which they exclude.3 In Pope and Bentley, we find that texts designed 
to institute correct relationships between words and things (which 
preserve presence by excluding pretenders) come to be infected by the 
idolatry and self-love those texts aim to purge.
So despite their stylistic, social, and political differences, Bentley 
and Pope come to share what Pierre Bourdieu cites as a necessary 
compulsion for those who would institute and conserve a system of 
symbolic domination: they must naturalize the arbitrary and politically 
interested character of the system of reference which they deploy to gain 
ascendance and maintain order.4 While each writer desires a self-evident 
relationship between system and truth, a key difference in their 
techniques and temperaments is that Bentley was striving to establish 
his—a new order defined by Newtonian physics, Protestant revelation, 
and Whig commerce—while Pope could appeal to received notions of 
common sense, that referential system which Augustan humanism had 
already managed to convert from history into nature.
In The Rhetoric of Science, William Powell Jones remarks that 
“Pope’s Dunciad reflects the classical gentleman’s scorn for the one­
sided specialist who lacks decorum.”5 The historical perspective 
Jones’s book creates reveals the conservative topoi Pope could rely on 
to carry his argument against the new science even though he 
misrepresents it and the historical figures who helped promote it. That 
empirical experimentation threatened the genteel conventions on which 
political ideology rested is marked by satires directed at scientists, an 
English tradition that started, claims Jones, in 1662 with the birth of 
the Royal Society and persisted well into the nineteenth century.6 As 
does The Dunciad, these satires aim to reduce the experimenters to 
persiflage: as is the political tactic today, the aim is to “de­
territorialize” the intellectual by making her seem an irrelevant crank, 
detached from social reality.7 But the derision carried fierce political 
and religious freight after the 1660’s, as Sir Charles Boyle and other 
protestants took into their experiments the Baconian zeal that scientific
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investigation could dismantle superstition and discover nature’s primary 
laws. Furthermore, as Jones argues, experimentation opened learning 
to all classes, thus threatening social as well as religious hierarchies.8 
So experimenting academics, though represented as ridiculous, came to 
evoke keen political resonances during the Restoration which lingered 
well into the the eighteenth century.
Given the heat that the rhetoric of science provoked, I agree with 
Vincent Carretta’s claim that The Dunciad IV is concerned with “The 
Politics of Education,” though by examining the mis-representation of 
Richard Bentley I will focus on the violence implicit in Pope’s apparent 
blind spots. Pope claims that one of the effects of tyrannical Dulness 
is to “blot out Order,” that is, “the distinctions between high and low” 
(4: 14). What I would like to demonstrate, using the logic of 
transgression articulated Stallybrass and White, is that Pope’s satire 
creates order and distinction only after performing precisely the verbal 
tyranny it vilifies.
As Carretta points out, “Pope sees contemporary education as 
serving the political ends of Dulness”;9 Dulness needs pedants because 
they force minds to adhere to arbitrary fragments—words divorced from 
things and use—and thereby prepare students for passive obedience to 
“arbitrary sway.” So dulled and abjected to a single source of devotion, 
Pope argues, the minds of England miss the irony of the Whig support 
of Monarch over Liberty, “The Right Divine of Kings to govern 
wrong.” Pope summarizes his position on verbal tyranny in a note, 
emphasizing that finally “Modem Education...establishes Self-love for 
the sole Principle of Action.”10 The world goes dark as solipsism 
reigns, sucking wisdom from the universe like a black whole draws 
light. But as the logic of transference suggests, maybe the dark is from 
Pope’s eyes. Is the apocalypse Pope predicts not so much the end of 
civilization as its movement away from the system of reference Pope 
tries to preserve as absolute for fear that an alternative cosmology 
would expose his own as merely verbal—as more arbitrary sway?
As Bourdieu explains, ideological systems such as Pope’s 
classicism depend upon a misrecognition of their arbitrary and 
exploitive status in order to reproduce themselves most economically; 
essential to that “genesis amnesia” is the transformation of history into 
nature, achieved by establishing the self-evident character of 
representation to apparently objective structures—or in Pope’s terms, 
words to things.11 With those ideological interests in mind, we see his 
strategy in attacking Bentley’s verbal criticism as a splitting of words 
from things, thus violating the common sense that Pope appeals to
3
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here which assumes that words have fixed, innate meanings—that is, 
that words mean by evoking links to reality that Pope’s cultural 
conservatism would sustain as natural, not historical. In Pope’s logic, 
the tyranny of Bentley’s criticism is that it breaks the natural order of 
words and meanings and so enslaves the mind from the order it would 
spontaneously seek if left free. This is why, as Pope explains in a 
note, “no branch of Learning thrives well under Arbitrary government 
but Verbal”12 That is, just as the pedant’s rules supposedly cut 
students off from the self-evident meanings and applications of words, 
so the tyrannical monarch (as James I illustrates) imposes laws that cut 
subjects off from natural liberty. As Carretta points out, Pope argues 
for a “mixt government” that would “form the inherent tension between 
the force of monarchy and that of liberty.”13 To extend the analogy 
Pope established between politics and education, we can imagine that he 
would advocate a healthy dialectic between the study of words and the 
“useful knowledge” to which they naturally refer.14
Though that tension between monarchy and liberty, instruction and 
use, may sound dialectical, as Bourdieu argues, such apparent 
oppositions function on assumptions we misrecognize due to their self- 
evident status, and those insidious assumptions guarantee that the 
interests of the dominant class will be effortlessly reproduced.15 
Clearly, what Pope aims to naturalize are the conventional ties between 
words and the notion of “useful knowledge” his Augustan hierarchies 
are built on. So long as he can maintain such conventions as self- 
evident, then verbal criticism and the new science must appear to his 
audience as Pope describes them—as arbitrary, fragmentary and 
corollaries to tyranny—since the larger, progressive contexts they 
actually work within are unimaginable to one settled into the received 
common sense to which The Dunciad appeals. In brief, there is deceit 
in Pope’s construction of what is arbitrary and what is meaningful in 
the study of words. That Pope’s common sense rests on exploitation is 
foregrounded if we examine how Pope’s imagination resolves a 
complicated historical referent such as Richard Bentley. What I will 
argue is that Pope’s representation of Bentley transgresses Pope’s own 
principle distinction between high and low when he performs verbal 
tyranny in order to represent it as a threat we should exclude.
Pope’s broadest and most necessary misrepresentation of Bentley’s 
thought and character involves aligning him and new science with 
Cartesian mechanics. Descartes’ cosmology argues for a material 
plenum, meaning that all space is actually filled by matter, thus 
reducing all motion to mechanical causation—in effect, in the context
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of The Dunciad, absolute tyranny by the sway of one force. Pope 
signals this cosmology early on by describing how “one instinct 
seizes...all the nations” who “Roll in her Vortex” (4: 74, 72, 84), with 
“vortex” here the clear marker of the Cartesian system. Late in the 
poem, Pope’s note reminds us of the materialism he combats. 
Commenting on this couplet—“Thrust some Mechanic Cause into his 
place, / Or bind in Matter, or diffuse in Space”—he remarks that “The 
first of these Follies is that of Des Cartes, the second of Hobbes, the 
third of some succeeding Philosophers.”16 Pope’s point is to highlight 
the folly of determinism that results from a notion of material plenum 
that squeezes out free will and spirit.
It is into that compressed space that Pope inserts Bentley. 
Warburton’s notes (to lines 255-271) makes that move explicit. 
Discussing the way Bentley makes students a “Slave to words” by 
teaching things without profit, Warburton concludes,
there is one general Method...and that is 
AUTHORITY, the universal Cement, which fills all the 
cracks and chasms of lifeless matter, shuts up all the 
pores of living substance, and brings all human minds to 
one dead level
Thus the charge is that Bentley’s arbitrary verbal orders, as he admits in 
the poem, “dim the eyes, and stuff the head” (4: 249), turning students 
into passive, concretized blocks who then roll in the cement plenum of 
Dulness’vortex.
No doubt this is a brilliantly dense fusion of imagery and 
contemporary science, succinctly melding in the figure of the vortex 
those issues of education, literature, philosophy, and politics that Pope 
says he is interested in (note to line 501). But I wonder if there isn’t a 
perverse vortex at work in a passage of poetry that coheres as tightly as 
Pope’s does. In yielding to the pleasure of this dense text, might 
readers get caught up in Pope’s own verbal sway? If, then, his words 
are broken off from things—if their relationship with historical 
referents is merely willful, i.e., arbitrary—doesn’t Pope, in effect, dim 
our eyes and stuff our head as we yield to his order, swayed by our 
desire for unity and aesthetic pleasure? If so, the text does not do what 
it says; contrary to its claims, it peforms the self-transgression that 
partial discourses rely on in order to naturalize their own conflicted 
origins.18
To resist that vortex that whorls us within the magic circle of the 
text’s formal boundaries, I would like to examine a few words that
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Pope’s character Bentley speaks that the historical Bentley actually 
wrote. The aim here is to trace Pope’s caricature of Bentley in order to 
reveal the its outline as ideological (thus self-reflexive) stamp. Though 
Pope, to emphasize Bentley’s solipsism, has Aristarchus say that “on 
Words is still our whole debate” (4: 219), in fact, as he articulated in 
his popular Boyle Lectures, Bentley was a Newtonian who advocated 
empirical research—he even “fitted up” the first chemistry lab at 
Cambridge.19 Among the very first to deploy the new science in a 
defense of Christianity, his aim with those words was precisely the 
opposite of what Pope has him say. Bentley’s Protestant rage against 
Papal superstition drove him to seek proofs of God apparently outside 
strict scripture, from, as he put it, “the Frame of the World.”20 Is this 
approach a fragment or a meal to an age craving reconcihation between 
materialism and church traditions?
In those Boyle Lectures Bentley is explicit in his rejection of the 
Cartesian plenum and other forms of materialism to which Pope reduces 
science in The Dunciad. But more precisely to the point is that the 
historical Bentley uses the word “cement” to express his perception of 
how the Newtonian void allows for free will and thus faith in an 
omniscient intelligence that holds particles together in coherent design 
despite the vast vacuum that surrounds them. Protestant divines 
endorsed Newton’s cosmology because, as the system stood in the years 
just following the publication of Principia, its empiricism and 
mathematics were viewed as rigorous tools of thought that could cut 
through Catholic superstition and thus lead to a more firm grasp of the 
forces that transcended reason and thereby offered rational arguments for 
the existence of a Christian God. How else to explain the presence of 
gravity (Newton assumed it was not innate in matter) or of the precise 
design of the solar systems within a void so huge that random 
collisions could never occur with the frequency required to settle matter 
into such order?21 So Bentley’s use of “cement” refers to the mystery 
revealed by faith that gives order to life, and this order applies 
simultaneously to three concentric spheres of influence. At the 
cosmological sphere—’’the frame of the world”—’’cement” is a figure 
for “the immediate fiat and finger of God” which “holds together this 
magnificent structure of the world” (Bentley 75). Moving inward to the 
socio-political sphere, “cement” figures “the influence of religion upon 
communities” because governments, says Bentley, depend on oaths 
offered to an omniscient being to sustain “ties of friendship and honour” 
(24-5). Finally, at the most inner, psychological level, Bentley uses 
“cement” to account for the “invisible tie...whereby matter and an
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incorporeal mind, things that have no similitude nor alliance to each 
other, can so sympathize by a mutual league of motion and sensation” 
(224). In each case, “cement” signals an order beyond reason that unites 
matter which otherwise would be scattered randomly in a void. 
Importantly, notice that in the two human spheres, this binding can 
only occur to those with faith: social cement is not ‘strained, and it 
adheres in individuals—hence, there is space for free will. As the 
historical Bentley used it, “cement,” metaphorizes faith which gives 
order to particles scattered in the void of the self, society and the 
cosmos—this is really the inverse of the mechanically encrusted “dead 
level” to which Pope’s Bentley gloats he can reduce students.
Pope’s Bentley appears to be an inverse distortion of the man. In 
the Boyle lectures, he is passionately committed to spiritual wholes 
since his overt enemy is Hobbesian atheism, with its emphasis on 
mechanical causation and brute self-interest. Thus Pope’s caricature of 
Bentley as proud Aristarchus, advocate of the study of words isolated 
from things and cultural context, reeks of the demonized. Pope’s fears 
makes selected fragments of Bentley’s work stick to a movement (the 
Satanic principle of Self-Love) that the writings actually resist. Rather 
than represent the Newtonian Bentley of the Boyle Lectures who insists 
on empirical observation and rational methodology to expand faith 
beyond the words of received tradition (and here we should recall Pope’s 
own flirtation with Newtonian physics22), Pope instead distorts 
Bentley’s language in order to convert him to the solipsistic pedant 
enrapt in his self-spun “slender store” of words.
We can catch Pope at it again if we trace the thread of reductive 
insect imagery back a few lines to Aristarchus’s account of his “critic 
Eye” as “that microscope of Wit” which “Sees hairs and pores, 
examines bit by bit” (4: 234-5). But here is what Bentley actually had 
to say about insects and the effect of microscopic eyesight on humans:
if the eye were so acute as to rival the finest 
microscopes, and to discern the smallest hair upon the 
leg of a gnat, it would be a curse, and not a blessing to 
us; it would make all things appear rugged and 
deformed...the smoothest skin would be beset all over 
with ragged scales and bristly hairs....Such a faculty of 
sight...would be little better than blindness itself (58-9).
What is fascinating is that in his Essay on Man, Pope appears to copy 
Bentley’s revulsion to the microscopic:
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Why has not man a microscopic eye?
For this plain reason, man is not a fly 
Say what the use, were finer optics given, 
T' inspect a mite, not comprehend the heaven? 
Or touch, if trembling alive all o’er 
To smart and agonize at every pore.23
Here we catch Pope at his instrumentalizing worst. In order to provide 
a vivid image that bolsters his polemic against those who imagine 
meanings outside established convention, Pope converts his source into 
an antagonist, thereby erasing his debts and associations with what he 
now attacks. Furthermore, he then represents those sources as low in 
order to separate himself from a former dependence and thus elevate 
Pope’s own literary stature. Significantly, this is a pattern that adheres 
to Pope’s relationship with Grub Street in general, most concretely in 
his antagonistic relationships with the publishers he used.24 More 
theoretically, in his drive to lower others in order to elevate himself, we 
see the destructive mechanism of ressentiment, particularly in the 
motive to “outdo the master’s [perceived] insults and better the 
instruction.”25
But to return to Bentley. Granted, his projects and remarks often 
approach self-parody, his pride in “discovering” the “digamma” among 
them. As Bentley is said to have proclaimed to a fellow Greek scholar,
Dionysius of Halicarnassus,...Aristarchus and 
Demetrius were all dunces, and knew nothing of the 
Digamma; which I have restored the use of, after it had 
been lost 2000 years.26
But his pride and precision did not necessarily make his wit 
microscopically fragmentary. Pope has Aristarchus insist that “our 
Digamma...o’er tops them all” as an indication of verbal criticism’s 
supposed disrespect for the ancients and its inward spiral from world to 
word, word to letter, letter to factional disputes about sounds of the 
letter (“Disputes of Me or Te”). Furthermore, Pope makes the size of 
the printed letter—it “o’er tops them” literally on the page as it was 
printed—signal how pride compels the drive to smaller horizons, but 
then compensates by swelling, a portrait of puffery whose comic 
absurdity is worthy of Monty Python.
But again, the push of the historical Bentley’s mind was to 
conceptual expansion, not contraction, despite his puffery. First of all, 
the history of the printed digamma’s size reveals how Pope himself
8
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fixes on a part to express his sense of the whole: as Bentley’s 
biographer James Monk informs us, “Bentley’s printer [had] no better 
method of representing the Digamma than by a Roman capital F.”27 
As a result, the digamma would appear rather exaggerated, as if to draw 
attention to itself and Bentley’s discovery; a sample might appear this 
way: ageu Fmpomi. But if it stood out, the reasons were at least in 
part typographical, not sherely imperial, as Pope claimed. Most 
important, however, were the contributions to Homeric studies and 
poetry that the digamma and its pronunciation made beyond the issue of 
the letter that Pope fetishIzed. Is it Pope's eye that fragments by 
obsession with the microscopic here? The literary issue of digamma is 
not about typesetting but about pronunciation and therefore rhythm, 
one of the widest frames of reference that shapes the epic. That is, 
Bentley saw the small particle as crucial to the “offensive hiatus in the 
verses of the Iliad and the Odyssey" that had vexed classicists and lovers 
of Homer for centuries; with the restored letter and pronunciation, 
editions of the poem became more authentic, and readings became more 
prosodically pleasing.28 So the historical Bentley saw that the 
fragment can contribute crucially to the meal. As his use of “cement” 
as concentric spheres also suggests, Bentley’s eye was not microscopic, 
it was microcosmic.
So Pope’s inverted Bentley is more violent than mere caricature, 
but further, I would argue that by pointing out the nature of the 
misrepresentation we can observe how the violence backfires on Pope. 
After all, for satire to conserve common sense, as The Dunciad aims 
to, it must preserve, in Pope’s own words, a distinction between high 
and low—thus the insane world represented in the poem highlights by 
contrast the sane world of received hierarchies that supposedly reside in 
us naturally. To keep that distinction alive—on which also rests 
Pope’s insistence that, naturally, words are fixed to things—the world 
represented must be close enough in spirit to the poem’s words to 
prevent Dulness from sticking instead to the poet who created her to 
smear his enemies. In other words, given Pope’s attacks on solipsism, 
if the caricatures don’t stick to the profaned historical world, the poem’s 
outside implodes into self-referentiality and the poem loses the high / 
low, inside / outside distinction it aims to enforce, in effect inhaling 
what the poet’s words would purge.
I believe this implosion is just what happens in Pope’s abuse of 
Bentley. Pope wants to distance us from historical trends such as 
Bentley’s hypnotic verbal tyranny, but when representations function 
by means of the very tyranny they claim to expose, then there is no
9
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outside for readers to retreat from because now tyranny adheres in the 
only categories of thought and language that yield access to that 
excluded Other. Recalling Stallybrass and White, we see that, once 
again, hierarchies are built upon contradictions and so express an 
inverse relation of connection with, not distance from, the disgust that 
fuels their reactive recoil.
I have already pointed out the principle of tyranny that occurs as 
Pope charges Bentley with a vision only of microscopic verbal 
fragments when in fact it is Pope who has fragmented Bentley’s 
scholarship and arguments for a Newtonian “frame of the world.” To 
use Pope’s own terms, here arbitrary sway—Pope’s twistings of 
Bentley’s language that now appear determined by the demonized 
principle of “Self-Love”—stuffs the reader’s head with words tom from 
their “natural” meanings, that is, tom from the context Bentley had 
historically established for them. This tearing from context carries the 
further self-transgression of recalling Pope’s own attack on virtuosi (4: 
397 ff). Instead of linking words to things, The Dunciad compels its 
readers to roll in Pope’s formal vortex, turning the wheel of an effect of 
tradition that Bourdieu calls “the habitus,” the momentum of culture 
that naturalizes exploitive representations and consequent social 
asymmetries, a circular confirmation process with which our 
scholarship is complicit when it reproduces Pope’s caricature 
uncritically.29
That so much of the aesthetic unity of the Pope’s poem is achieved 
by the very tyrannical impulse he condemns foregrounds a corollary of 
the conflictual foundation of hierarchies; to draw again from Stallybrass 
and White, we learn that “disgust always bears the imprint of desire.”30 
Although their sentence applies too broadly to The Dunciad to do much 
justice to in this essay, I would like to conclude my discussion of 
Pope’s representation of Bentley with a speculation on Pope’s desire for 
what he claims disgusts him. As I have suggested, The Dunciad is 
about seizing power by catching others up into an arbitrary sway of 
signifiers, and that is how it performs as it sucks up historical figures 
and eager readers, then converts them to a position that Pope 
manipulates with the anal glee of the virtuosi he castigates in the 
passage on Annius (4: 347-94). We have already seen how Bentley gets 
transformed in Pope’s vortex, but I want to emphasize that it happens 
to the reader, too: by mistaking Dulness and her manifestations as 
allegorical references to historical conditions, readers then distinguish 
between that “low” world of temporal process and the “high” world of 
established practice. But once we recognize how ideologically interested
10
Studies in English, New Series, Vol. 11 [1995], Art. 36
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/studies_eng_new/vol11/iss1/36
434 BENTLEY IN THE DUNCIAD
Pope’s representations are, we understand that the “common sense” we 
revert to out of disgust is not a given separate from it but rather also a 
construction in an inverse relation to and thereby dependent on, even 
infected by, the object of disgust.
But calling the subject merely an effect of language lets Pope off 
too easy. I am more inclined to grant him willful intention in the self­
transgression of The Dunciad, thereby aligning aesthetic control not 
merely with the virtuiosi’s anality, but with Auden’s sadistic joker who 
compensates for his own lack of identity by stealing another’s 
autonomy in order to destroy it. In the drive to elevate the self through 
the abjection of another is also, as we have noted before, Nietzsche’s 
critique of such negative mastery through ressentiment. Either way, 
this creation of identity through contempt must ultimately—as does the 
self-transgressive structure of The Dunciad, as I have argued here— 
undermine the desire that drives it.31
Of course, a more sympathetic reading of Pope could also claim 
that the self-transgressive structure of The Dunciad is in response to 
the decay with which history threatens unitary subjectivity. But 
whether the motivation is desire or fear, my point is that Pope’s move 
is toward the displacement of history into aesthetic structure. This 
move aims to resolve conflictual experience by totalizing it in the 
imagination, thereby masking the historical contradictions that provoke 
the subject into writing. The irony, of course, in this move is that in 
believing that imaginative totality—in Pope’s believing his own 
rhetoric—the subject misrecognizes the temporal, mediated status of the 
thought structures on which he has built that totality. So, once again, 
Pope’s attacks on Dulness’s arbitrary verbal sway only serves to 
highlight that issue in his own position, which he presents as natural. 
Or, to grant Pope reflexivity, perhaps his awareness of the verbal status 
of his own classicism actually fuels his contempt for hack work that 
exposes the scribbled nature of the civilization he aims to defend from 
the advance of Dulness.
I am inclined to grant Pope the creeping awareness that the jig is 
up: as Grub Street de-mystifies writing and destabilizes humanism, its 
dunces expose a rift in the supposedly self-evident fit between language 
and truth. So the apocalypse Pope predicts is self-referential: what he 
foresees is the end not of the world, but of the end of Augustan 
classicism as the sole sun of reference around which all civilized 
signifiers revolve. Once people recognize that the orders signified by 
writing are expressions of chronic interest rather than eternal
11
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inspiration, the “Order” Pope formerly enjoyed must end, making the 
dread black out of civilization the apocalypse of privilege.
NOTES
1 In The Twickenham Edition of the Poems of Alexander 
Pope, ed. John Butt (London: Metheum, 1943), 5: 344.
2The documented cases of Bentley’s arrogance and 
vindictive abuse of power are too many to do him justice in this 
essay. Suffice to say that twice formal charges and a call for his 
dismissal were brought upon him by his faculty; twice those 
charges passed, despite Bentley’s pull at court, all the way to a 
Bishop’s judgment against him; and twice the Bishop died just 
prior to sentencing, preventing Bentley’s dismissal from power at 
Trinity College. Bentley was also venal. The most celebrated 
case for that charge was his selling his never-completed edition 
of the Bible by subscription, for which he even wrote up an 
advertisement. Called “Bentley’s Bubble” by his Tory antagonists 
at the college, when he received his first payments for it he “is 
said to have shaken the guineas in his hand and exclaimed, ‘None 
but the poor in mind would refuse gold when offered'“ ; in R. J. 
White, Dr. Bentley: A Study in Academic Scarlet (Lansing: 
Michigan State UP, 1968), p. 188. The classic and certainly most 
exhaustive account of Bentley remains James Henry Monk, The 
Life of Richard Bentley, 2 vols. (London: F. Rivington, 1833). On 
Bentley’s push for Anglican hegemony, see Margaret Jacob, The 
Newtonians and the English Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 
1976), p. 18. For Bentley’s lectures and essays on cosmology and 
classical scholarship, see The Works of Richard Bentley, ed. 
Alexander Dyce, 3 vols. (London: Macpherson, 1838). Quotes 
from this edition will be cited parenthetically in this essay as 
“Bentley.” For a rather glowing account of Bentley’s 
contributions to classics studies, see M. L. W. Laistner, “Richard 
Bentley: 1742 - 1942,” in SP 39 (1942), 521; a more balanced 
appraisal appears in E. J. Kenney, The Classical Text (Berkeley: 
U of California P, 1974).
3See The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (London: 
Metheun,1986), p. 2.
4 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice trans. 
Richard Nice (1972; Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1977), p. 183.
5William Powell Jones, The Rhetoric of Science (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966), p. 66.
6The satires were so prevalent that Thomas Sprat in his 
History of the Royal Society warned that “wits and raileurs of this 
age...shall decry the promoting of experiments [and] deprive 
themselves of the most fertil subject of fancy”. He also chides his 
opponents for “making [science] ridiculous because it is new.” In 
W. P. Jones, Science, p. 64.
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7I borrow this term from Mary Louise Pratt, who used it 
during a 1991 colloquium at UT-Austin to describe the efforts of 
contemporary conservatives to make advocates of multi­
culturalism appear out of the mainstream. Thus their positions, 
along with other forms of putative “Politically Correct” thinking, 
are made to seem un-American.
8W. P. Jones, p. 112.
9In Vincent Carretta, The Snarling Muse (Philadelphia: 
University of Philadelphia Press, 1983), p. 141.
10The Twickenham Edition, 5: 391.
11See Bourdieu, “Modes of Domination,” Outline, pp. 159- 
197.
12The Twickenham Edition, 5: 358.
13Carretta, p. 148.
14“Useful knowledge” appears in the note on education, 
Twickenham Edition, 5: 358.
15Bourdieu’s expression for this hidden circular process 
that converts history into nature is the “habitus,” p. 79.
16The Twickenham Edition, 5: 387.
17Ibid, p. 369.
18By “self-transgression” I draw on Gayatri Spivak’s use of 
the term in her account of the “point where a text covers up it 
grammatological structure,” in her “Translator’s Preface” to On 
Grammatology by Jacques Derrida (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
UP, 1974) p. lxxiii.
19See Monk, vol. 2, p. 202.
20Bentley, Works, p. xi.
21 Bentley discusses these Newtonian features in 
“Confutation of Atheism from the Origin and Frame of the 
World,” Works, p. 163 ff.
22In This Long Disease, My Life (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1968), Marjorie Nicholson and G. S. Rousseau argue that Pope 
attended lectures by a millinarianist named William Whitson who 
fascinated Pope with new physics—until Whitson’s wacky project 
for discovering longitude (which later worked) drew fire from 
the Scriblerus Club, prompting Pope to retract his interest and 
deem those earlier lectures he’d attended the “wicked words of 
Whitson.” This scornful revision ties in with points I will make 
later about Pope’s abuse of his those he once relied on.
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23 Dyce, Bentley’s editor, excerpts an article in the 
Quarterly Review (46 [1824], 128-129) that not only argues for 
this link, it further points to both authors’ debt to a passage in 
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
24Here I refer to Pope’s fabled dependency on and abuse 
of his publisher, Barnaby Lintot.
25In Walter Kaufman, Nietzsche (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1950), 372.
26Monk, 2: 367.
27Ibid, p. 362.
28Ibid, p. 362.
29“The habitus, the durably installed generative principle of 
regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to 
reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective condition of 
the production of their generative principle...[Thus] the 
‘unconscious is never anything other than the forgetting of history 
itself produces by incorporating the objective structures it 
produces in the second natures of the habitus,” in Bourdieu, p. 79. 
To claim the aesthetic recalls forms of experience distinct from 
history is to reinscribe history in the very forms of escape from it.
30Transgression, p. 191.
31Sartre explores the self-defeating trajectory of desire in 
sadism a nd masochism in Chapter Three of Being and 
Nothingness (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956): “sadism 
and masochism are the two reefs on which desire may founder,” 
p. 404.
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